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Abstract 
 
Foreign direct investment offers a rich laboratory in which to study the broader economic effects 
of securities market mispricing. We outline and test two mispricing-based theories of FDI. The 
“cheap assets” or fire-sale theory views FDI inflows as the purchase of undervalued host country 
assets, while the “cheap capital” theory views FDI outflows as a natural use of the relatively low-
cost capital available to overvalued firms in the source country. The empirical results support the 
cheap capital view: FDI flows are unrelated to host country stock market valuations, as measured 
by the aggregate market-to-book-value ratio, but are strongly positively related to source country 
valuations and negatively related to future source country stock returns. The latter effects are 
most pronounced in the presence of capital account restrictions, suggesting that such restrictions 
limit cross-country arbitrage and thereby increase the potential for mispricing-driven FDI. 
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I. Introduction 
 On occasion, prices in capital markets deviate from fundamental values by significant 
amounts.1 How does capital market mispricing affect corporate investment patterns? A 
considerable body of theoretical work has considered this question. Most of it predicts that real 
investment will be positively correlated with mispricing. For instance, Keynes (1936) highlights 
the effect of stock market misvaluation on the cost of equity, while Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000) point out that equity mispricing can, through its 
impact on perceived collateral values, also affect the cost of debt. In a related vein, Stein (1996) 
and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) discuss how equity undervaluation constrains real 
investment. More recently, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) consider how mispricing affects merger 
and acquisition activity, predicting that overvalued firms tend to be acquirers and noting that 
undervalued firms make especially attractive targets. 
 The empirical literature, in contrast, is much less settled. For example, Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) find little evidence that 
mispricing affects investment, while Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 2004) and Baker et al. (2003) 
argue that it may have important effects.2 Others find that stock prices are strong determinants of 
equity and debt issuance, and that firms that raise external finance experience unusually low 
stock returns, on average, following the issue, suggesting that they were successful in timing 
their issues to periods when capital was cheap. But once again, others dispute the interpretation 
                                                 
1 For surveys of the vast literature on capital market inefficiencies, including discussions of the reasons why 
mispricings are not easily arbitraged away, see Shleifer (2000) and Barberis and Thaler (2002).  
2 See also Fisher and Merton (1984), Barro (1990), Polk and Sapienza (2003), and Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and 
Huberman (2003).  
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of these results.3 A fair summary is that empirical studies on whether and how mispricing affects 
corporate investment patterns leave open many questions. 
In this paper, we examine whether and how stock market mispricing affects foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Prior studies have focused on other determinants of FDI. For instance, theories 
of the multinational enterprise grounded in the trade literature stress the roles of host country 
market size, production scale economies, factor endowments, trade and investment barriers, and 
tax rates.4 Froot and Stein (1991) and Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002), among others, consider 
the interaction of exchange rate shocks and capital market imperfections. This work has yielded 
many important insights about the complex nature of foreign direct investment. It has tended to 
assume, however, that international capital markets are integrated and informationally efficient, 
which runs contrary to accumulating evidence. At the same time, FDI offers a potentially quite 
rich setting in which to look for broader effects of mispricing. Among other advantages, it allows 
the researcher to separately study the impact of host and source country valuations. This is useful 
because host country valuations contain relatively more information about investors’ perceptions 
of the marginal profitability of FDI, while source country valuations say more about a foreign 
investor’s cost of capital. Within-country investment-Q equations do not allow for any analogous 
separation, limiting what can be learned. 
                                                 
3 Studies that connect valuations to equity issuance include Marsh (1982), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Loughran, 
Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994), Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996), Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998), and Graham and 
Harvey (2001). Stigler (1964), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Baker and Wurgler (2000), among others, find that 
equity issuers have abnormally low equity returns in the years following the issue, but Brav and Gompers (1997) 
and Fama (1998) challenge the interpretation of some of these results. Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1999) find that 
speculative-grade debt issuers experience low subsequent stock returns, and Richardson and Sloan (2003) find that 
raising external equity or debt is associated with low subsequent returns. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 
(2003) and Verter (2003) find support for the mispricing-driven view of mergers in US data. 
4 Models of horizontal investment, such as Markusen (1984), predict more investment in larger markets where gains 
from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of building additional capacity. Models of vertical investment, such as 
Helpman (1984), describe the incentive to locate production to take advantage of factor cost differences. Empirical 
evidence on these channels include Brainard (1997), Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001), Blonigen, Davies, and 
Head (2003), and Yeaple (2003). Gordon and Hines (forthcoming) survey the literature on the effect of host country 
tax rates on FDI. 
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To better motivate how mispricing could affect FDI, let us start with an example of such 
mispricing. Froot and Dabora (1999) study the share prices of Royal Dutch, which trades mainly 
in the US, and Shell Transport, which trades mainly in the UK. Royal Dutch and Shell pay 
dividends in a 60:40 ratio in accord with a longstanding merger agreement. Hence, if capital 
markets were efficient and integrated, the relative price would be fixed at 60:40. Yet Froot and 
Dabora find that the actual ratio varies between 36:40 and 66:40 in their sample. Moreover, they 
find that the relative price of Royal Dutch increases when the US stock market increases relative 
to the UK market, suggesting broad, country-level investor demand pressures. While Royal 
Dutch-Shell is but one case, it involves a very large multinational whose share prices are set on 
the world’s best-functioning capital markets, and other such “Siamese twin” shares exhibit 
similar deviations from theoretical parity.5 Accumulated evidence of this sort suggests the 
hypothesis that mispricings of corporate assets across international markets, while difficult to 
cleanly document except in rather special cases, could be widespread enough to have detectable 
effects on international capital flows. 
Specifically, we consider two channels through which mispricing could affect FDI. We 
call the first the “cheap assets” channel. In this channel, FDI inflows represent the purchase of 
undervalued host country assets—or, to be precise, the purchase of host assets at less than their 
integrated-and-efficient-world-markets benchmark price. Undervaluation could result from low 
investor sentiment for host country assets, or a liquidity crisis that causes liquidity-constrained 
firms to be available to unconstrained foreign acquirers at “fire sale” prices. The latter story is 
                                                 
5 Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), and de Jong, Rosenthal, and van Dijk (2003) discuss other 
cases of “Siamese twin” shares whose relative price behavior seems best explained by some form of relative market 
mispricing. Studies of country closed-end funds by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994) and Bodurtha, Kim, 
and Lee (1995) offer another clean setting in which the valuation of a set of cash flows appears to depend on where 
it trades. Bekaert (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), and Henry (2000) find evidence of stock market segmentation 
in broader samples of countries and firms. 
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developed in Froot and Stein (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Krugman (1998) and Aguiar 
and Gopinath (2003). Empirical evidence on this channel is limited to Aguiar and Gopinath 
(2003), who find that cross-border M&A into five Asian countries increased during the late-
1990s crisis, with foreign acquirers concentrating on liquidity-constrained targets.  
The second channel is the “cheap capital” channel. Here, FDI outflows represent a natural 
use of the low-cost capital available to overvalued firms in the source country. To the extent that 
much FDI is cross-border M&A, such a channel can arise as an application of the Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) model of mispricing-driven acquisitions to a cross-border setting. Shleifer and 
Vishny point out that managers of an overvalued acquirer may know that their overpricing will 
end eventually, but in the meantime they can benefit their ongoing investors, at the cost of new 
ones, by purchasing less-overvalued assets with new capital. For firms that are overvalued 
because of a domestic bubble, natural candidate investments would include targets abroad that 
are not overvalued or zero-net-present value greenfield investment. Moreover, through its effect 
on perceived collateral values, overpriced equity also can reduce the cost of debt, and thus can 
stimulate cash-financed FDI.6 In one respect, the cheap capital channel seems more plausible 
than the cheap assets channel: It asks a manager to identify misvaluation only of his own firm, as 
                                                 
6 In Baker et al. (2003), overvalued equity relaxes a binding leverage constraint, creating debt capacity, but debt is 
correctly priced. In practice, mispriced equity can also affect the cost of debt. For instance, in a manner like the 
balance sheet channel in Bernanke and Gertler (1995), credit-scoring models used widely by financial institutions, 
such as those developed by Moody’s KMV, use a firm’s share price as an input to compute the probability that it 
will default. Overpriced shares thus can lead to an underestimate of credit risk and and an abnormally low cost of 
debt (and vice-versa). Typical extensions of such models, such as KMV’s Private Firm Model, estimate credit risk 
for private firms using stock market valuations for comparable public firms. The widespread use of such models 
suggests how a domestic stock market bubble can affect the cost of capital for even nontraded firms. The balance 
sheet channel, combined with the parent’s implicit guarantee of its affiliates’ debt [Caves (1999, p. 139)], also 
suggests how mispricing in the source country capital market affects an affiliate’s cost of capital even when that 
capital is raised locally.   
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opposed to that of a target asset that may be thousands of miles away.7 We appear to be the first 
to outline and test a cheap capital approach to FDI. 
Overall, our empirical results tell a very consistent story: The cheap assets channel is not 
important, at least as a general determinant of FDI, and the cheap capital channel appears to be 
quite important. We make use of three FDI data sets. The main one is the BEA panel of FDI 
flows between the US and nineteen other countries, from 1974 through 2001. We also examine 
data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving US firms, and a large bilateral panel of 
FDI flows among twenty countries. We start with simple regressions that show that FDI outflows 
are strongly positively related to the average market-equity-value-to-book-equity-value ratio of 
publicly traded firms in the source country, consistent with a cheap capital channel. In contrast, 
FDI inflows are not related to the market-to-book ratios of the host country, inconsistent with fire 
sales. These results are evident in all of our data sets and are robust to various specification 
choices. Put simply, high source country stock market valuations push out FDI, but low host 
country valuations do little to pull it in. Indeed, the push effect of valuations is considerably 
stronger than that of any of several control variables we include.  
Of course, stock market valuations capture not only mispricing but also many other 
fundamental drivers of FDI. An important part of our analysis is to develop and implement a 
fairly general methodology that allows us to confirm, to the extent possible, that FDI outflows 
are specifically connected to the component of source country market valuations that reflect 
                                                 
7 In addition to information, multinationals have certain other advantages over portfolio investors in conducting 
cross-market arbitrage. For example, consider a hedge fund manager who sells short to exploit a perceived 
overpricing of his country’s stock market. If the mispricing gets worse before it corrects, he may have to close the 
position at a loss due to margin requirements or agency relationships that shorten his horizon [Shleifer (2000), ch. 2 
and ch. 4]. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that US hedge funds generally ride the Internet bubble rather than 
trade against it. The manager of an overvalued multinational, on the other hand, is in a better position: If she raises 
external finance to acquire overseas assets, and her firm’s shares then appreciate further, her shareholders are 
unlikely to be upset. Stein (2004) develops this argument. In sum, we do not suggest that FDI is the sole form of 
international capital market arbitrage, but in contrast to Hymer (1960) we do find it a priori quite reasonable that it 
may be one such form.  
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mispricing. Three results serve to establish such a connection. First, we apply the logic that 
mispricings tend to correct over time, and use ex post stock market returns to instrument for the 
component of market-to-book that reflects ex ante mispricing. We find that FDI outflows are 
strongly related to this component. Second, we exploit the observation that capital controls limit 
cross-market arbitrage and thus, other things equal, increase the likelihood that an extreme 
market-to-book ratio reflects mispricing. (Exogenous variation of this sort, unavailable to within-
country studies, is another crucial advantage to using FDI to study the economic effects of 
mispricing.) We find that source country valuations indeed have stronger effects in the presence 
of capital controls. Third, we combine the two approaches. We find that the component of source 
country market-to-book associated with mispricing has its strongest effect in country-years in 
which capital accounts are less open.  
To summarize, the results provide the first evidence that stock market valuations and 
mispricing may play an important role in FDI patterns, and in a manner consistent with a cheap 
capital but not a cheap assets channel. However, a caveat is that although our data sets include 
the vast majority of FDI flows, they focus on fairly developed countries. Thus, the results do not 
necessarily conflict with Aguiar and Gopinath’s (2003) evidence of fire sales in a small set of 
developing countries during a financial crisis. Our more positive and important conclusion is that 
a novel “cheap capital” view of FDI receives consistent support. This adds a new dimension to 
the FDI literature and also sheds indirect light on why, within countries, investment and merger 
activity are positively correlated with stock prices.  
The rest of the paper proceeds in three sections. Section II describes our econometric 
methodology and our data. Section III contains the empirical results. Section IV concludes. 
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II.  Methodology and data 
A.  Methodology 
The two main hypotheses are that FDI is higher when the capital in the source country is 
cheaper (i.e., when the source country stock market is overvalued) and when the assets in the 
host country are cheaper (i.e., when the host country stock market is undervalued). The key 
econometric challenge is to separate the effect of stock market misvaluation from the effects of 
other influences on FDI, in particular those that are also reflected in stock market valuations. In 
this subsection, we develop our methodological approach in terms of the effect of source country 
valuations. The analysis for host country valuations is almost identical. Suppose that the FDI 
flow from source country i to host country j is given by 
ijtjtHitSitijt ccbaFDI 1εφφδ ++++= , (1) 
where δ is the degree of overvaluation in country i at time t and φk measures fundamentals in 
country k. Fundamentals are a potentially long vector of country characteristics, which in 
principle would include the level of human capital, legal or technological development, 
profitable investment opportunities, and other fundamental (i.e., non-mispricing) determinants of 
FDI, multiplied by a set of loadings. We are interested in whether b is greater than zero. 
The first approach is to run regressions using the country-level market-to-book-value 
ratio as a proxy for δ. If book value serves as a rough measure of fundamentals, a high market-
to-book suggests that the country’s stock market may be overvalued.8 Market-to-book is 
inversely related to future equity returns in the cross-section of US stocks (Basu (1983), Fama 
and French (1992)) and international stocks (Fama and French (1998)). Also, the aggregate US 
                                                 
8A country-level price-earnings or price-dividend ratio could also be used as a proxy for misvaluation. Scaling by 
book equity is preferable since it ensures that the denominator is positive and it reduces the influence of transient 
fluctuations in profits or payouts.  
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market-to-book ratio is inversely related to subsequent market returns (Kothari and Shanken 
(1997), Pontiff and Schall (1998)). These results are consistent with the idea that extreme values 
of market-to-book represent, in part, misvaluations that subsequently correct. Extreme values of 
market-to-book are directly connected to extreme investor expectations by La Porta (1996), La 
Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), and Frankel and Lee (1998). With this literature 
as motivation, we start with regressions of the type 
ijt
it
ijt eB
MbaFDI 11ˆˆ ++= . (2) 
Of course, a positive and significant coefficient does not prove that b>0, since 
itit
it
d
B
M φδ ++= , (3) 
where the coefficients on δ and φ are normalized to be one. (Also to ease the exposition, we 
assume that there is no measurement error in the market-to-book ratio.) In other words, while the 
market-to-book ratio may be a good proxy for δ, it is also a good proxy for the other omitted 
country characteristics that influence FDI. For example, some theories of FDI link investment to 
host country GDP, tax rates, and factor endowments, and these fundamentals may be correlated 
with the stock market. As a result, b1 will be a biased estimator of b. Some of these effects we 
can control for directly in eq. (2), but omitted variable bias will inevitably remain.  
For example, it is particularly challenging to control for the rational expectations version 
of the wealth effect in Froot and Stein (1991), further examined in Klein and Rosengren (1994), 
Dewenter (1995), and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002). According to this theory, FDI patterns 
are driven by cross-country differences in firms’ collateralizable wealth, or financial slack. 
Favorable shocks to relative wealth, as might result from stock market fluctuations or unhedged 
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exchange rate changes, allow firms in the relative-wealth-increasing country to escape borrowing 
constraints and outbid firms in the relative-wealth-decreasing country for domestic assets. 
To address the generic omitted variable bias, we take two approaches. The first is to use 
the future returns on the source country stock market as a cleaner proxy for mispricing. The idea 
is that, if the stock market were overvalued at the end of 1990, we would expect lower returns in 
subsequent years as the mispricing is corrected. Unfortunately, there is no a priori notion of the 
exact horizon over which to expect correction. Too short a horizon leaves open the possibility 
that the ex ante mispricing has not yet corrected, while too long a horizon reduces power in a 
short time series. We use one-year-ahead returns to match the collection period of our FDI data. 
This is also consistent with the results of Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall 
(1998), who find that aggregate market-to-book forecasts one-year-ahead returns. Putting this in 
the context of eq. (1), we view returns at t+1 as a function of δ at time t, 
121 ++ ++= ititit feR εδ , (4) 
where f<0, i.e. overvaluation at time t leads to lower average returns in t+1. Here, we assume that 
future returns are not related to fundamentals φ. In other words, we assume that countries with a 
higher level of human capital, legal or technological development, or growth opportunities do 
not have systematically lower returns.9 Our first approach is then to regress market-to-book on 
future returns and to use the fitted values from that first stage to explain FDI,  
ijt
it
ijt eB
MbaFDI 22
ˆˆˆ ++= . (5) 
Because the fitted values are uncorrelated with φ, this gives us an unbiased estimate of b. 
                                                 
9 The orthogonality conditions are that the correlations between δ and ε2, and between φ and ε2, are zero. 
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Our second approach addresses a potential shortcoming of the first: that the correlation 
between φ and ε2 is not zero. That is, suppose investors are routinely too optimistic when 
underlying investment opportunities are genuinely good—the recent US Internet bubble fits this 
pattern. Under this story, future returns and FDI could be connected without any causality from δ 
to FDI.10 To address this possibility, our second approach exploits cross-country variation in 
capital market openness and the omitted variable bias in eq. (2) to put a lower bound on the 
magnitude of b.  
To illustrate, we start by substituting eq. (3) into eq. (1) to get a clearer view of the 
omitted variable bias. Without loss of generality, we can substitute for φ, obtaining  
( ) ( ) ijtjtHitS
it
SSijt ccbB
McdcaFDI 1εφδ ++−++−= . (6) 
Hence in the simple regression of FDI on market-to-book in eq. (2), the independent variable is 
not orthogonal to the residuals. The omitted variable bias takes the form: 
( ) ( )( )itBM
ititB
M
SS cbcb var
,cov
1ˆ
δ−+= , (7) 
where the ratio is the fraction of the market-to-book ratio that is explained by mispricing. As is 
intuitive, when all variation in market-to-book is due to mispricing, the coefficient is an unbiased 
estimate of b, and when mispricing is nonexistent, it is an unbiased estimate of cS.  
                                                 
10 Another critique of our first approach is that M/B might predict returns because it is capitalizing the “rational” 
discount rate for assets in that country—lower costs of capital imply higher M/B and lower required (expected 
future) returns. Keep in mind that our null hypothesis is efficient and integrated world capital markets. Under this 
null, risk premia are set on the world capital market, and variation in valuation ratios such as M/B reflect either 
variation in rational expectations of corporate cash flows (i.e., fundamental investment opportunities) or in the risk 
inherent in those cash flows, but not in risk premia, since they are not country-specific under the null. Put 
differently, while variation in a country’s M/B could reflect rational variation in the cost of capital of firms traded 
within that country, this could, under the null, only reflect the relatively low risk of corporate assets in that country. 
It does not mean that those firms would have any cost advantage in purchasing overseas assets (or, indeed, domestic 
assets), and hence there is no reason, under the null, for such a component of M/B to explain international capital 
flows. In any case, this critique is addressed by our second approach to omitted variable bias. 
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In perfectly integrated capital markets, arbitrage will reduce the absolute value of δ.11 
This suggests using the degree to which the capital market is closed as an indicator of where δ 
might appear in the first place. Suppose that capital market closedness perfectly measures the 
extent (not the direction) of the mispricing problem, i.e. the fraction of country stock valuations 
not explained by fundamentals. Then we can substitute eq. (7) into eq. (2) and estimate 
( ) ijt
it
Sitijt eB
McCACbaFDI 33 ˆˆˆ +⋅++= , (8) 
where CAC measures the degree to which the capital market in country i is closed at t. b3 is not a 
direct estimate of b but of (b – cS). Thus if b3 is greater than zero, we can infer that a unit change 
in the mispricing component of market-to-book has a greater impact on FDI than a unit change in 
the fundamentals component. 
To reiterate, our second approach to omitted variable bias uses the observation that, all 
else equal, cross-market mispricing is more likely when cross-market arbitrage is difficult, and 
takes the presence of capital restrictions as a natural proxy for this difficulty. The cheap capital 
hypothesis then predicts that FDI and valuations will be especially closely related when the 
source market is segmented from others. Other theories of FDI that assume efficient and 
integrated capital markets, including the relative wealth theory of Froot and Stein (1991), do not 
make this prediction. More generally, if the relationship between FDI and valuations is spurious, 
there is no reason it should strengthen in the presence of capital controls. 
Finally, a fuller version of the model would suggest that the sensitivity of FDI to the 
component of valuations that reflects mispricing would be higher when capital controls are 
                                                 
11 Of course, even within a single capital market, relative mispricing can appear, as demonstrated by Mitchell, 
Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003). But within a single market as well, mispricings are 
more common and more severe among securities where arbitrage is relatively difficult. See the many examples cited 
in Shleifer (2000).  
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operative, while the sensitivity to any residual component would not. To test this finer prediction 
we combine the two approaches, using future returns as a cleaner proxy for δ and closed capital 
markets as an instrument for the existence of mispricing: 
( ) ijt
it
iitijt eB
McCACbaFDI 44
ˆ
ˆˆˆ +⋅++= . (9) 
As before, b4 is not a direct estimate of b, but if it is positive, we infer that the component of 
market-to-book that reflects mispricing has a greater impact on FDI than the component that 
reflects fundamentals. And again, other theories of FDI do not make predictions for b4.  
 
B.  FDI Data 
Direct investment is distinguished from other international capital flows by the degree to 
which the investor owns and controls the foreign enterprise. To be precise, some definitions are 
useful. Direct investment is typically defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by a 
single domestic legal entity (the parent) of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an 
incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign 
business enterprise (the foreign affiliate). Direct investment flows are then the funds that parents 
provide to their affiliates net of the funds affiliates provide to their parents.  
Direct investment flows are of three types: equity capital, intercompany debt, and 
reinvested earnings.12 Equity capital flows include payments between parents and third parties 
that occur when parents change their ownership interests, as well as changes in the equity capital 
contribution of parents to affiliates that are wholly owned. These flows therefore capture the 
movement of capital used for mergers and acquisitions. Intercompany debt flows occur when 
                                                 
12 The results below are for FDI inclusive of retained earnings. The results are driven entirely by the more active 
component of FDI. In other words, removing retained earnings from the dependent variable leads to the same 
conclusions (results available on request). 
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parents alter the level of their net outstanding loans and trade accounts with the affiliate. 
Reinvested earnings are the parents’ claim on the current-period undistributed after-tax earnings 
of affiliates. Direct investment positions (i.e., stocks not flows) are the parents’ net financial 
claims on their affiliates, whether these claims take the form of equity or debt.13 
Our main FDI data set is drawn from the results of the Survey of US Direct Investment 
Abroad and the Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, both conducted by the 
US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We use a sample that includes information on the 
position and flow of FDI into and out of the US each year from 1974 through 2001.14 These data 
have some attractive features for us. The panel of flows to and from the 19 countries for which 
we also have stock market data (described below) is reasonably complete. These data have also 
been collected on a consistent basis over time—across source countries for FDI into the US, and 
across hosts for FDI out of the US. Using the BEA data, we measure FDI flows as percentages of 
the initial FDI position: 
ji
t
ji
t
ijt Position
Flow
FDI →
−
→
=
1
, (10) 
where i is the source country is and j is the host. Since small initial positions can lead to outliers 
in this measure, we truncate it at +100 percent.15  
                                                 
13 For additional details on how FDI flows and positions are defined, see Borga (2003). 
14 Because those who do not comply with their survey requests are subject to fines and imprisonment, and because 
companies are reassured that the “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes 
is prohibited,” the BEA believes that these data are reasonably complete and accurate.  
15 Like Caves (1989), we scale flows by initial country-specific stocks. Froot and Stein (1991) scale flows by GNP 
and Dewenter (1995) scales M&A flows into the US by domestic acquisition activity. Scaling by initial position 
renders the FDI measure more comparable across countries. This is not important in regressions where we include 
country fixed effects. In such regressions, we have verified that the results are essentially unchanged when we scale 
by GDP. In regressions containing future returns, however, such as those along the lines of eq. (5), we prefer not to 
use country fixed effects. We are interested in whether FDI is especially high when future returns are low. With 
country fixed effects, an alternative and less interesting interpretation would be that future FDI is low when future 
returns are low, since demeaned FDI is high. To avoid this ambiguity, we scale by initial stocks and leave out 
country fixed effects in the regressions motivated by eq. (5).  
 14 
FDI is notoriously difficult to measure; to determine robustness, we also use two other 
FDI data sets. One is based on mergers and acquisitions data from Securities Data Company 
(SDC). As noted in Nocke and Yeaple (2003) and United Nations Center for Transnational 
Corporations (1999), a large fraction of FDI flows are due to cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. The SDC sample includes transactions in which a US firm is either the target or the 
acquirer and covers 1978 through 2001, although the first half of the sample appears 
incomplete.16 We measure M&A-based FDI from the US to the UK, for example, as the number 
of acquisitions by US firms of UK firms divided by the initial number of US affiliates in the UK. 
The latter is taken from the BEA and is available from 1984 through 1999.  
We also use a panel of FDI flows and positions from the OECD International Direct 
Investment Statistics database. These data include the outflows and outward position of OECD 
countries’ FDI with respect to a broad set of host countries, not only OECD members. This 
sample covers 1980 through 2001. Although these data would appear to have an advantage in 
coverage, data for many country pairs are missing, and there are significant differences in how 
different countries collect and report their data. Nonetheless, results from these data may provide 
a useful sense of robustness when viewed alongside those from the other data sources. We 
measure FDI flows in these data as in eq. (10).  
The FDI data are summarized in Panel A of Table 1. The BEA data contains 407 (439) 
observations on FDI inflows into (outflows from) the US, or an average of 21.4 (23.1) years of 
data for each of the 19 non-US countries for which we also have consistent stock market data. 
The average annual FDI flows into the US from one of these countries increases its initial 
                                                 
16 One advantage of these data is that acquirer firms are classified by their country of origin. Therefore if a firm uses 
a holding company outside of its home country to buy a firm in the US, we can classify this transaction as taking 
place between the acquirer’s home country and the US. The FDI flow and position data do not trace investment back 
to the country of parent origin.  
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position by 20.30 percent. Likewise, on average, the annual FDI flow from the US to one of 
these countries increases its initial position by 11.56 percent. Mean M&A activity is significantly 
higher for transactions involving a US acquirer, increasing their number of affiliates by 13.83 
percent per year, than for transactions involving a US target, at 3.53 percent of lagged affiliates. 
Mean flows from OECD members amount to 23.36 percent of their initial positions.  
 
C.  Stock market valuations and returns 
Stock market valuations and returns for 19 non-US countries are from Ken French’s 
website.17 His data include country-year observations of the capitalization-weighted market-to-
book-equity ratio and stock market returns in both dollars and local currency over the 1975-2001 
period. For details of the construction of these variables see Fama and French (1998).18 We 
merge in US values, taking the market-to-book ratio on the S&P 500 from Compustat and returns 
on the S&P 500 from the CRSP database. Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics.  
 
D.  Country characteristics and controls 
Other data come from a variety of sources. The return on equity, weighted across 
publicly-traded firms by book value, is from Ken French’s website. The real exchange rate is 
calculated using nominal exchange rates and price indices from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics. The exchange rate series are indexed so that the dollar exchange rate in 1975 is set to 1 
in each country. Gross domestic product and GDP per capita in 1995 US dollars are from the 
                                                 
17 http://mba.tuck.darmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
18 The raw data are from Morgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). The set of firms whose data 
is used to construct country-level returns and profitability variables is essentially the set of firms included in Morgan 
Stanley’s stock index for that country. These tend to be large firms, and for a typical country they in total cover 
roughly 80 percent of the domestic stock market’s invested wealth. Depending on the country and year, data are 
based on a minimum of a few dozen large firms to a maximum of several hundred; see Fama and French (1998), 
Table I. As discussed there, there is little issue of survivor bias in these data.  
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World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Statutory corporate income tax rates are from the 
World Tax Database maintained by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of 
Michigan.19 These are the maximum marginal statutory corporate tax rates in that country-year. 
Capital account closedness is based on the index of Brune et al. (2001), which tabulates 
restrictions on nine kinds of capital account transactions. (The Brune et al. openness index equals 
the number of transactions that are not significantly restricted; we count the number that are 
restricted to form a closedness index, to better match the econometric derivation.) Panel C of 
Table 1 reports summary statistics. 
 
III.  Empirical results 
A.  Valuation levels 
Table 2 starts with simple regressions, in the spirit of eq. (2), to document the basic 
correlations between FDI and stock market valuations. The dependent variables are the BEA 
measures of FDI into and out of the US. The independent variables of interest are the source and 
host country market-to-book ratios. To the extent that market-to-book captures misvaluation, the 
cheap capital story predicts that the coefficient on the market-to-book of the source country stock 
market will be positive, while the cheap asset story predicts that the coefficient on the market-to-
book of the host country will be negative. But as discussed above, because market-to-book also 
picks up omitted determinants of FDI, Table 2 is not a precise test of our hypotheses, but more of 
a first step to document some basic relationships. At the same time, just determining the raw 
effects of source and host stock market valuations will yield some new insights, as prior work on 
FDI has looked only at relative market valuations.  
                                                 
19 http://wtdb.org/index.html. 
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The BEA data, while preferable for other reasons, are not well suited to testing the cheap 
capital and cheap assets stories simultaneously. For instance, in the left columns of Table 2, 
which study FDI into the US from 19 source countries, the source country valuations vary each 
country-year, but the host (the US) valuations vary only yearly, and so their effect cannot be 
estimated at all in the presence of year effects. Similarly, in the right columns, which examine 
FDI out of the US, host valuations vary at the observation level but source (the US) valuation 
effects are estimated only from the fairly short time series. Given this ‘shape’ of the data, we will 
rely on FDI into the US to examine the cheap capital story, and we’ll use FDI out of the US to 
test the cheap assets story.  
The specifications in Table 2 are reminiscent of standard investment-Q equations used to 
study investment within countries, except that we can separately study the source and host 
country valuations. Caves (1989) and Klein and Rosengren (1994) consider the ratio of source 
and host valuations, but we are interested in whether one effect dominates. We also control for a 
range of other determinants of FDI. Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997) find that real 
exchange rates affect FDI flows into the US. We include the return on equity, as a measure of 
cash flow is often included alongside Tobin’s Q in investment equations. Fazarri, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988) and Lamont (1997) find that investment increases in internal finance, perhaps 
because external finance is more costly. The relative return on equity in the source and host 
countries also proxies for the relative attractiveness of fundamental investment opportunities. We 
include the log of GDP and GDP per capita to capture country size and wealth. Desai, Foley, and 
Hines (2004) find that US multinationals move capital toward low tax locations, so we include 
corporate tax rates. Finally, many countries impose capital account restrictions. We include an 
index of restrictions based on Brune et al. (2001). In addition to these controls, we use country 
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and sometimes year effects. Factors like distance and other country fixed effects are motivated 
by models of FDI based in trade theory. 
The specifications in the left panels of Table 2 exploit heterogeneity of conditions across 
countries investing in the US. They provide preliminary support for the cheap capital hypothesis. 
The coefficients on the source country market-to-book are reliably positive and significant, 
irrespective of control variables and fixed effects. The coefficients are also large. The standard 
deviation of non-US market-to-book ratios is 0.97, so a one standard deviation increase in source 
country market-to-book leads to a six to nine percentage point increase in FDI into the US. This 
compares to a mean inflow of 20.30 percentage points.  
Prior studies of FDI flows into the US, including Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen 
(1997), find a negative coefficient on real exchange rates. We do not find a consistent effect. 
This appears to be due to the sample period. Froot and Stein’s (1991) sample, for example, 
begins in 1973 and ends in 1988. When we focus on this period in our own data, we also find a 
negative coefficient. However, our data continue through 2001, and the negative correlation 
between FDI into the US and the real exchange rate breaks down in this segment. In the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, the dollar fell but FDI inflows also declined. More recently, the dollar 
has strengthened and inflows reached record levels. Klein et al. (2002) also note the apparent 
breakdown of this relationship. 
The right panels of Table 2 analyze FDI out of the US to 19 host countries. Country-year 
level variation in host country conditions allow for a preliminary assessment of the cheap assets 
view. The results provide little support for this hypothesis: The coefficients on the host country 
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market-to-book are weak and positive, not strong and negative. The most robust coefficient is the 
negative effect of host country corporate taxes, consistent with Desai et al. (2004).20  
Table 3 reproduces these specifications with other FDI data sets. The first two panels 
consider cross-border merger and acquisition transactions that involve a US firm as acquirer or 
target. We measure M&A into the US from a particular country as the number of US firms 
acquired by firms from that country. We scale this by the total number of US affiliates of firms 
in the source country at the start of the year. M&A activity out of the US to a particular country 
is the number of firms in a host country acquired by US firms, again scaled by the number of 
affiliates of US firms in that country at the start of the year.  
The results confirm our initial findings. In the left columns, the coefficients on the source 
country market-to-book ratio are positive and significant, indicating that acquisitions of US firms 
increase when overseas stock markets are highly valued. This is consistent with the Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) theory of mergers and acquisitions. In the right columns, however, we again see 
no support for the idea that cross-border M&A is driven by low valuations of the target. 
However, US firms’ overseas acquisition activity does appear to be strongly dependent upon US 
valuations, also consistent with the cheap capital hypothesis, although this effect is estimated 
from only a fairly short time series.  
The last panel of Table 3 studies a panel of bilateral FDI outflows among 20 developed 
countries from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. While these data are subject 
to some concern about comparability across countries and time, in principle they allow us to 
simultaneously consider the cheap capital and cheap asset hypotheses in a broad sample. The 
                                                 
20 The results here and in all subsequent tables are unchanged when we control for short- or long-term government 
interest rates using data from the Global Financial Database (results available upon request). However, since we 
could obtain interest rates only for 85 to 90 percent of our sample, we do not include them in these regressions.  
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results here are essentially identical to those from the US-based data sets: source country 
valuations have a strong and positive influence on FDI, while host valuations are unimportant.  
Summing up, the analysis so far demonstrates a new fact about FDI flows: there is a very 
strong positive link between source country stock market valuations and FDI, potentially 
consistent with a cheap capital view of FDI. The other result thus far is the lack of evidence of 
“fire-sale FDI.” However, one must keep in mind the nature of our sample. Our stock market 
data cover 20 mostly developed countries. While developed countries account for the vast 
majority of the world’s FDI flows [Feenstra (1999)], they may not provide the most powerful 
sample for testing the cheap assets view. Developing countries may be more prone to the 
extreme economic fluctuations that create conditions for fire sale FDI, and the existing evidence 
on the cheap assets view, Agiuar and Gopinanth (2003), uses samples exclusively from emerging 
markets. Hence, the strongest statement we can make is that cheap assets motives are unlikely to 
be important as a general determinant of FDI.  
 
B.  Fundamental and non-fundamental valuations 
We now take a closer look at the positive correlation between source country valuations 
and FDI. While at face value this correlation is consistent with the cheap capital hypothesis, it is 
also consistent with many other explanations, reflecting the fact that stock market valuations pick 
up not just misvaluation but also many omitted fundamental determinants of investment. Here 
we use future stock returns as an instrument for the component of market-to-book that reflects 
mispricing, the identifying approach discussed in eqs. (4) and (5). For brevity, we focus on the 
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BEA data on FDI flows into the US, which offers the most variation in source country 
valuations.21 
As discussed in the methodology section, the idea behind this approach is that mispricing 
ex ante is can be detected from the returns that correct the mispricing ex post. If future returns 
are negatively correlated with ex ante mispricing and otherwise uncorrelated with measurement 
error in market-to-book, the fitted values from the first stage serve as a purer measure of 
mispricing. The first stage regression of market-to-book on one-year-ahead dollar returns yields 
172.082.1
ˆ
+−= it
it
R
B
M , (11) 
with 426 observations and a heteroskedasticity robust t-statistic of 5.07. The residual, and more 
likely fundamental, component of the market-to-book ratio is 
ititit B
M
B
M
B
M ˆ~ −= . (12) 
Clearly, in decomposing valuations into fundamental and non-fundamental components like this, 
we are imposing the assumption that mispricing is corrected over the next year. As a result, a 
portion of the mispricing component of valuations may remain in the residuals in eq. (12). If so, 
the decomposition would be conservative.  
Table 4 reports the second stage, revealing that FDI flows are positively related to both 
the fundamental and nonfundamental components of stock market valuations.22 Note that the 
latter coefficient implicitly shows that FDI predicts lower returns in the source stock market. 
                                                 
21 A broader set of results is available upon request. 
22 Of course, we could simply put future returns in the second stage regression, but using fitted values allows the 
reader to compare the coefficients in Table 5 with those in Table 2.  
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This is difficult to explain within existing theories of FDI, rooted in rational expectations and 
efficient and integrated world capital markets.23 
The nonfundamental coefficient in Table 4 is about 2.5 times as large as the residual M/B 
coefficient. (F-tests indicate that this difference is significant at the 10 percent level in the last 
two specifications.) Both effects remain strong when additional controls and year effects are 
included. Since the standard deviation of the nonfundamental component of M/B is only 21 
percent that of the residual component, a very rough estimate of overall economic significance 
would be that, according to this methodology, mispricing appears half (2.5 times 0.21 equals 
0.52) as important as the fundamental component of source country valuations in explaining FDI 
flows. This strikes us as a magnitude that is both interesting and believable.  
 
C.  Limits to cross-market arbitrage 
While the future returns results seem highly suggestive that FDI increases when capital is 
cheap, they do not completely rule out a spurious correlation. The key identifying assumption is 
that future returns are uncorrelated with omitted country characteristics that influence FDI. 
However, in a somewhat convoluted story, a technology shock could simultaneously cause FDI 
outflows and an overvalued stock market. For instance, asset price bubbles sometimes appear in 
times of rapid technological change.  
                                                 
23 Table 5 is structured to emphasize the determinants of FDI, but we have explicitly confirmed the implication that 
FDI flows into the US could be used to predict source country returns (with a negative sign). A table is available on 
request. We have also verified that these results are not driven by the small-sample bias in return prediction 
regressions discussed in Nelson and Kim (1993), Kothari and Shanken (1997), and Stambaugh (1999). That is, when 
the independent variable is persistent and its innovations are correlated with the dependent variable, its predictive 
power will be overstated in an OLS regression. Fortunately, the FDI series are not highly persistent (the average 
country autocorrelation is 0.06; only three are significantly positive) and innovations are uncorrelated with 
contemporaneous returns (the average correlation is 0.12; only one is significantly positive).  
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As discussed in the methodology section, we address this objection by testing whether the 
effect of source country valuations is more pronounced where capital account restrictions are 
most severe. The idea is that such restrictions limit cross-market arbitrage, making extreme 
values of market-to-book in the presence of such restrictions more likely to reflect mispricing. 
Put differently, we can use capital account closedness as an instrument for the existence of 
mispricing, not the direction.  
Table 5 reports regressions in which we interact valuation ratios with an index of capital 
account restrictions based on Brune et al. (2001). In Tables 5 and 6, we standardize this variable 
to have zero mean and unit variance. The left columns show that capital account restrictions tend 
to increase the effect of source country market-to-book, with a significant effect in the first 
specification and a marginally significant effect in the second. The interaction is not significant 
in the third specification. (Remember that, as discussed in more detail in the methodology 
section, this test can only detect an effect if the coefficient on the mispricing component of M/B 
is actually larger than the fundamental piece. Hence, an insignificant result is not a rejection of 
the premise.) However, an F-test reveals that this specification implies that at the lowest level of 
the capital account restrictions index, which characterizes slightly less that 10 percent of the 
sample, the source country aggregate market-to-book-value ratio is no longer a significant 
determinant of FDI.  
The effect of capital account restrictions comes through more sharply when we combine 
empirical strategies, using future returns to hone in on the mispricing component of market-to-
book and looking at the effect of that component in the presence of capital account restrictions. 
The results are in the right columns of Table 5. In each of these specifications, the coefficients on 
the fitted component of source market-to-book, and on its interactions with capital account 
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restrictions, are positive and significant. Meanwhile, the coefficients on the fundamental 
component of valuations are positive and significant, but the interaction terms are not. This 
pattern of results accords closely with predictions. It suggests that the strategy of using capital 
account restrictions and future returns to identify mispricing is successful, and represents fairly 
convincing evidence that FDI is increased by the presence of cheap capital.24  
One potential source of confusion is that capital account restrictions take several forms, 
including restrictions on FDI outflows. While we already control for restrictions directly, it is 
useful to verify that the interaction results in Table 5 come about through the ability of CAC to 
identify mispricing and not through a mechanical (nonlinear) effect on FDI. Table 6 investigates 
this issue using alternative indices of capital account restrictions. We consider three alternative 
indices. One specifically excludes any FDI restrictions (both inward and outward); one includes 
only outward FDI restrictions; and one includes only restrictions on capital and money market 
securities. Excluding FDI restrictions makes little difference to the interaction coefficients, 
compared to those reported in Table 5. Likewise, an index based solely on restrictions on FDI 
outflows has no interesting interactive effects. This confirms that restrictions on FDI outflows 
are not driving the effects documented earlier. Rather, much of the effect of the overall index 
appears to be coming through capital market restrictions, as suggested in the last columns of 
Table 6. This again is nicely consistent with the capital market mispricing hypothesis. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
A substantial literature has examined the link between securities market mispricing and 
corporate investment patterns, but a consensus has not emerged. In this paper, we ask whether 
                                                 
24 We find similar results if the capital control indicator from the IMF is used in place of the Brune et al. (2001) 
measure. 
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and how mispricing affects foreign direct investment. Prior research has not considered FDI from 
this perspective, but FDI actually offers a rich laboratory in which to look for economic effects 
of mispricing. In particular, we exploit country-year level variation in stock market valuations, 
realized returns (which contain ex post information about ex ante mispricing), and limits to 
cross-market arbitrage, to develop a series of more powerful and potentially more revealing tests 
than were available to prior, within-country studies.  
The results of all of our tests point to the same conclusion: source country mispricing is 
important for FDI, but host country mispricing is not. Put simply, overpriced stock markets push 
out FDI, but underpriced stock markets do not pull it in. We perform several exercises to hone in 
on the specific component of source-country stock market valuations that constitutes mispricing, 
and to confirm that it is indeed this component that has the strongest effect on FDI outflows. In 
sum, the results point to the existence of a novel “cheap capital” or cost-of-capital influence on 
FDI. Since most existing theories of FDI follow Hymer (1960) in assuming that international 
capital markets are informationally efficient and integrated, we suggest that the cheap capital 
view offers a realistic and potentially useful addition to that literature. At the same time, the 
results also provide indirect evidence that cost of capital motives may be an important reason 
why investment and stock prices are positively correlated within countries. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. Means, medians, standard deviations, and extreme values for foreign direct 
investment, stock market valuations and returns, and country characteristics. Panel A summarizes three sources of 
data on foreign direct investment. FDIiUSt and FDIUSit are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and report annual 
FDI flows in which the US is the host or the source country, respectively. FDI flows are measured here as the gross 
FDI flow as a percentage of the beginning of year stock. M&AiUSt and M&AiUSt are from SDC and measure cross-
border mergers and acquisitions activity involving US firms as targets or acquirers, respectively. M&A flows are 
expressed as the number of new affiliates acquired as a percentage of the number of affiliates existing at the 
beginning of the year. FDIijt is a full panel of bilateral FDI flows among developed countries from OECD 
International Direct Investment Statistics. FDI flows are measured here as the gross FDI flow as a percentage of the 
beginning of year stock. Panel B shows stock market valuations and returns data. International stock market returns 
in dollar and local terms, Rit, and the average market-equity-to-book-equity ratio of public firms, M/Bit, are from 
Ken French’s website and are based on data from Morgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). We 
use the S&P 500 return from CRSP and the S&P 500 market-to-book ratio from Compustat to merge in US values. 
Panel C summarizes country characteristics and control variables for a sample of country-years that represents the 
intersection between the stock market data and the BEA data on FDI into the US. For non-US countries, the return 
on equity ROEi is from Ken French’s website and based on MSCI data. US values for the S&P 500 are from 
Compustat. The real exchange rate is from IMF International Financial Statistics and is in units of foreign currency 
per US dollar, with the index set to 1 for 1975. GDP and GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US dollars are 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Non-US income tax rates Taxi are from the World Tax 
Database maintained by the Office of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. US income tax rates are 
from the NBER. The index of capital account closedness CACit is from Brune et al. (2001).  
 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
 Panel A. Foreign direct investment 
FDIiUSt (%)  407 20.30 16.29 26.91 -70.97 100.00 
FDIUSit (%) 439 11.56 9.60 13.94 -33.78 100.00 
M&AiUSt (%)  286 3.53 2.66 3.48 0.00 20.91 
M&AUSit (%) 286 13.83 8.28 17.94 0.00 100.00 
FDIijt (%)  2,706 17.49 12.15 30.25 -100.00 100.00 
 Panel B. Stock market valuations and returns 
M/Bit 407 1.81 1.66 0.97 0.37 9.84 
M/BUSt 407 3.14 2.73 1.78 1.20 7.01 
Rit+1 (%, Dollar) 388 15.01 11.81 29.25 -47.07 135.80 
Rit+1 (%, Local) 388 16.14 13.76 27.08 -39.42 153.67 
RUSt+1 (%, Dollar) 388 14.91 20.42 14.77 -11.09 35.71 
 Panel C. Country characteristics and controls 
ROEit (%) 407 12.08 11.73 3.94 3.47 31.75 
ROEUSt (%) 407 16.19 14.99 4.06 10.65 22.98 
Exrateit (1975=1) 407 1.04 1.01 0.20 0.56 1.69 
GDPit ($B1990) 407 803 297 1,140 29 5,680 
GDP/Capit ($1990) 407 24,890 23,821 8,330 10,742 47,064 
Taxit (%) 407 34.77 35.00 10.97 5.43 56.00 
CACit 407 3.76 3.00 2.83 0.00 9.00 
Table 2. FDI and Stock Market Valuations. Regressions of FDI into and out of the US on the local market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and 
controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. The first six columns show regressions explaining FDI flows into the US. The 
second six columns show regressions explaining FDI flows out of the US. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) FDI out of the US (FDIUSit) 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 6.29 [2.98] 9.86 [5.63] 8.05 [3.99] 0.75 [1.32] 0.63 [0.61] 0.57 [0.33] 
M/BUSt -2.31 [-2.17] 0.47 [0.29]   1.22 [0.91] 1.35 [0.89]   
ROEit   -1.17 [-2.23] -1.21 [-2.20]   0.62 [3.02] 0.31 [1.23] 
ROEUSt   0.95 [2.20]     0.08 [0.35]   
Exrateit   0.03 [0.33] -0.23 [-1.40]   -0.06 [-1.58] -0.05 [-1.05] 
log(GDP)it   5.12 [0.15] 14.02 [0.39]   -5.82 [-0.89] -3.26 [-0.46] 
GDP/Capit   -3.26 [-2.47] -3.67 [-2.77]   -0.40 [-0.89] -0.15 [-0.34] 
Taxit   -0.14 [-0.60] -0.20 [-0.87]   -0.23 [-2.04] -0.25 [-2.13] 
CACit   -0.21 [-0.24] -0.97 [-1.04]   -0.34 [-1.06] -0.63 [-1.75] 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  439  439  439 
R2  0.07  0.15  0.23  0.08  0.13  0.17 
Table 3. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Alternative Data Sources. The first two panels show regressions of 
M&A activity into and out of the US on the local market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and controls. 
The M&A data are from the SDC. Panel A shows regressions explaining M&A activity into the US. Panel B shows 
regressions explaining M&A activity out of the US. The last panel shows regressions of FDI between 20 developed 
countries on the source country market-to-book ratio, the host country market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI 
data are from the OECD. The control variables are return on equity in the source and host country, and the exchange 
rate, log of GDP, GDP per capita, tax rates, and capital controls in the source country. All variables are summarized 
in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces.  
 
 Excluding controls Including controls 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
 Panel A. M&A into the US (M&AiUSt) 
M/Bit 1.89 [8.36] 1.63 [6.05] 1.64 [5.61] 
M/BUSt 0.12 [1.34] -0.18 [1.21]   
       
Fixed effects:       
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  286  286  286 
R2  0.74  0.78  0.82 
 Panel B. M&A out of the US (M&AUSjt) 
M/Bjt 0.59 [0.53] 3.42 [0.35] -0.70 [-0.68] 
M/BUSt 5.56 [10.03] 5.55 [5.69]   
       
Fixed effects:       
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  286  286  286 
R2  0.69  0.73  0.74 
 Panel C. Bilateral FDI flow (FDIijt) 
M/Bit 4.14 [6.73] 6.13 [5.76] 4.79 [4.04] 
M/Bjt -0.40 [-0.56] 0.79 [0.88] 0.52 [0.53] 
       
Fixed effects:       
Country (i and j)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  2,706  2,706  2,706 
R2  0.06  0.07  0.09 
Table 4. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Components. Regressions of 
FDI into the US on the source country market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI 
data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book 
ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component (Residual 
M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 
1.82 – 0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
       
Fitted M/Bit 17.58 [2.85] 21.70 [3.31] 22.00 [2.82] 
Residual M/Bit 7.60 [4.54] 9.52 [4.81] 8.72 [3.28] 
M/BUSt -2.06 [-2.15] -2.80 [-2.12]   
ROEit   -0.54 [-1.19] -0.61 [-1.27] 
ROEUSt   0.81 [1.61]   
Exrateit   0.11 [1.54] -0.01 [-0.13] 
log(GDP)it   0.38 [0.22] -0.26 [-0.15] 
GDP/Capit   -0.50 [-2.65] -0.48 [-2.52] 
Taxit   -0.06 [-0.41] -0.06 [-0.41] 
CACit   0.55 [1.01] 0.17 [0.28] 
       
Fixed effects:       
Year  No  No  Yes 
       
N  388  388  388 
R2  0.06  0.10  0.17 
Table 5. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Closed Capital Accounts. Regressions of FDI into the US on the source country market-to-book ratio, the US 
market-to-book ratio, their interactions with a capital account openness index, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in 
Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component 
(Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 – 0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). 
Market-to-book or its components are then interacted with an index of capital account closedness from Brune et al. (2001) for the second stage regression. CAC 
is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 M/B M/B decomposition 
 Coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 7.95 [3.57] 10.93 [5.16] 8.71 [3.72]       
M/Bit · CACit 4.89 [2.04] 4.43 [1.68] 2.30 [0.88]       
Fitted M/Bit       13.40 [2.00] 18.87 [2.65] 17.07 [2.04] 
Fitted M/Bit · CACit       19.37 [3.26] 22.49 [3.86] 21.51 [3.35] 
Residual M/Bit       8.74 [4.88] 10.77 [5.05] 9.35 [3.37] 
Residual M/Bit · CACit       1.01 [0.54] 3.00 [1.48] 1.83 [0.89] 
             
Controls  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  388  388  388 
R2  0.08  0.16  0.23  0.09  0.13  0.20 
Table 6. FDI and Stock Market Valuations: Alternative Definitions of Capital Account Closedness. Regressions of FDI into the US on the source country 
market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, their interactions with a capital account openness index, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All 
variables are summarized in Table 1. We decompose the source country market-to-book ratio into a non-fundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and 
a fundamental component (Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a first stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 – 
0.72Rit+1 (N=426, t-stat=5.07). Market-to-book or its components are then interacted with alternative versions of the Brune et al. (2001) measure of capital 
account closedness for the second stage regression. The Brune et al. measure includes restrictions on five types of activities: invisible transactions, capital and 
money market transactions, credit market operations, FDI, and commercial banking transactions. The first four are divided into ingoing and outgoing restrictions. 
We consider measures that exclude the FDI components of the index; that are based only on capital market restrictions; and that are based only on outgoing FDI 
restrictions. Each measure is separately standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are in braces. 
 
 FDI into the US (FDIiUSt) 
 M/B M/B decomposition 
 
Excluding FDI 
Outgoing FDI 
closedness 
Capital market 
closedness Excluding FDI 
Outgoing FDI 
closedness 
Capital market 
closedness 
 Coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat coef t-stat 
             
M/Bit 9.41 [3.69] 7.68 [3.79] 7.77 [3.72]       
M/Bit · CACit 3.57 [1.32] 0.75 [0.49] 3.53 [1.78]       
Fitted M/Bit       16.03 [1.88] 22.20 [2.85] 16.61 [2.00] 
Fitted M/Bit · CACit       22.89 [3.52] 1.13 [0.21] 25.92 [3.20] 
Residual M/Bit        9.60 [3.36] 8.08 [2.93] 8.38 [3.14] 
Residual M/Bit · CACit       1.97 [0.93] 1.19 [0.76] 2.15 [1.19] 
             
Controls  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Fixed effects:             
Country  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
N  407  407  407  388  388  388 
R2  0.23  0.23  0.24  0.21  0.18  0.21 
 
